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How to Segment OT and Industrial Control Networks From IT

Protect PLCs, SCADA and building systems by separating them from office IT with zones, conduits and a DMZ, following the Purdue model and IEC 62443 principles.

Advanced11 min7 steps

Before you start

  • An inventory of OT assets: PLCs, HMIs, SCADA servers, engineering stations
  • The data flows between OT and IT
  • Firewalls that can sit between zones

Step by step

  1. Map assets and flows

    List each OT device, its location and what it talks to. Passive discovery tools are safer than active scanning on fragile control systems.

  2. Define zones

    Group assets by function and risk: field devices and controllers, supervisory (SCADA/HMI), site operations, and the enterprise IT network. Each zone gets its own VLAN and subnet.

  3. Build an industrial DMZ

    Place shared services, such as historian replicas, patch servers and remote-access jump hosts, in a DMZ between IT and OT. No direct connections from IT to controllers.

  4. Write conduit rules

    Allow only the specific protocols and addresses needed between zones (for example OPC UA from SCADA to the historian). Block everything else and log denied traffic.

  5. Control remote access

    Vendors and engineers connect through a jump host with MFA, session recording and time-limited accounts, never directly to PLCs.

  6. Harden and monitor

    Change default credentials, disable unused services, and monitor OT traffic for unusual commands or new devices.

  7. Plan changes carefully

    OT systems often cannot reboot freely. Coordinate firewall and switch changes with operations and test in maintenance windows.

Pro tips

  • Use industrial switches rated for the environment in field cabinets.
  • Keep a tested offline backup of PLC programs and configurations.
  • Treat USB drives as a conduit too.