Tutorials · Security

How to Harden RADIUS Against Blast-RADIUS (CVE-2024-3596)

Close the Blast-RADIUS forgery attack: require Message-Authenticator on every packet, upgrade servers first, move RADIUS off untrusted networks and plan the move to RADIUS over TLS (RadSec).

Advanced20 min8 steps

Quick answer

Blast-RADIUS (CVE-2024-3596) lets an attacker positioned between a switch, AP or VPN gateway and its RADIUS server turn an Access-Reject into an Access-Accept. It works by forcing an MD5 collision in the RADIUS response. It affects nearly all RADIUS-over-UDP implementations that authenticate with PAP, CHAP or MS-CHAP.

The fix is to require the Message-Authenticator attribute on every request and response, and in the long term to carry RADIUS inside TLS. EAP-based 802.1X is not practically exploitable because EAP already requires Message-Authenticator.

Key terms

Message-Authenticator
A RADIUS attribute (number 80) holding an HMAC-MD5 of the whole packet. It stops the collision attack when it is required on both sides.
NAS (RADIUS client)
The device that asks RADIUS: a switch, access point, wireless controller, VPN gateway or firewall.
RadSec
RADIUS carried over TLS (RFC 6614, TCP port 2083). It encrypts and authenticates the whole exchange.
Proxy-State
An attribute used when RADIUS requests are forwarded between servers. The attack abuses it to hide the collision data.

Before you start

  • A list of every RADIUS server and every NAS (switches, APs, controllers, VPN, firewalls)
  • Admin access to the RADIUS server
  • A maintenance window for client changes

Step by step

  1. Inventory where RADIUS travels

    Note which RADIUS packets cross the internet, a provider WAN or a shared network. These are the exposed paths. RADIUS inside one locked management VLAN is lower risk.

  2. Upgrade the RADIUS server first

    Patched servers add Message-Authenticator to every reply. FreeRADIUS fixed this in 3.0.27 and 3.2.5. Install the latest 3.2.x release, which also fixes later RadSec issues.

  3. Require Message-Authenticator on the server

    Start with 'auto', which enforces it for clients that already send it. Set it to 'true' per client once the client is upgraded.

    security {
      require_message_authenticator = auto
      limit_proxy_state = auto
    }
    client core-switch-1 {
      ipaddr = 10.99.0.11
      secret = <long-random-secret>
      require_message_authenticator = yes
    }
    
  4. Upgrade and configure every NAS

    Install vendor firmware that sends and checks Message-Authenticator, then enable the 'require Message-Authenticator' option if the device has one.

  5. Prefer EAP over PAP/CHAP

    Use EAP-TLS or PEAP for 802.1X and VPN where possible. Avoid PAP over untrusted networks.

  6. Move RADIUS off untrusted links

    Send RADIUS across sites only inside IPsec, a site-to-site VPN, or RadSec. Never send RADIUS/UDP over the open internet.

  7. Rotate shared secrets

    Use a unique random secret of at least 22 characters per client. This does not stop Blast-RADIUS but limits damage from other leaks.

  8. Verify

    Capture a test login and check that both the Access-Request and the reply contain Message-Authenticator as the first attribute.

    tcpdump -i eth0 -vv udp port 1812
    

Commands are generic, industry-standard examples. Exact syntax and menu names vary by model and firmware; check your device's manual on the Documentation page.

Pro tips

  • Shorter timeouts, MFA and dropping Proxy-State do not fix Blast-RADIUS on their own. Only Message-Authenticator enforcement or TLS transport does.
  • Accounting-only RADIUS is at very low risk. Prioritise authentication traffic.
  • Upgrade servers before clients. A patched server works with unpatched clients in 'auto' mode.

Last reviewed:

FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Is my Wi-Fi with WPA2/WPA3-Enterprise affected by Blast-RADIUS?

Not in practice. 802.1X uses EAP, and EAP already requires Message-Authenticator. Check that your access points and controller run current firmware anyway.

Which authentication methods are vulnerable?

RADIUS over UDP with PAP, CHAP or MS-CHAP. This is common on VPN gateways, network-device admin logins and some captive portals.

Does the attacker learn passwords?

No. The attacker forges an accept response but does not learn the user's password or the shared secret.

What is the long-term fix?

Run RADIUS inside TLS (RadSec, RFC 6614) or over a protected management network, and require Message-Authenticator everywhere.

Stuck on a step?

Ask Navijin technical support or an authorised partner for help with your configuration.